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Introduction 
The mature Leibniz closely interconnected happiness and rationality: according to him, 
humans’ road to happiness must be equivalent to their road to wisdom.1 In the field of politics 
he tried to defend this thesis by an interpretation of both terms that was prudential and 
utilitarian, overtly or in hedonistic clothing. As he wrote in a fragment: “Wisdom is the 
science of happiness. / Virtue is the habit of acting in accord with wisdom. / Justice is the 
charity of the wise man, i.e., that which is congruent with the will of the good and prudent 
man,” while defining happiness at the same time as “a durable state of pleasure.”2 
                                                          
 This study is part of a project “Leibniz und Osteuropa: machtpolitische und 
religionspolitische Aspekte in Praxis und Theorie” at Max Weber Centre for Advanced 
Cultural and Social Studies of the University of Erfurt that has received funding from the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie 
Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 665958. As to the preliminary work, I wrote this paper 
on the basis of my research as a Herzog-Ernst-Fellow in Gotha Research Centre of the 
University of Erfurt in 2015. I thank Andrea Langner, Manuela Sauerwein, and Anke Seifert, 
the librarians in the Special Collections Reading Room of the Erfurt University Library, for 
their invaluable help during my work with the Collection Boineburg. I also thank Martin 
Mulsow, Iris Schröder, and my co-fellows at Gotha Research Centre of the University of 
Erfurt for their comments and suggestions, as well as the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation for the 
generous support of my research. I would also like to express my thanks to Ursula 
Goldenbaum, Knud Haakonssen, Peter Schröder and Cornel Zwierlein for their critical 
remarks on the first draft of this paper. 
1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Political Writings, ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), 105; Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 46–47. 
2 Quoted after Nicholas Rescher, Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1979), 137. Cf. Hubertus Busche, “Leibniz’ Lehre von den drei Stufen des 
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The present study shall contribute to the reconstruction of the efforts of the young 
Leibniz to find an integral formula for rationality, justice, and happiness. A strong consensus 
exists among scholars of Leibniz’s life and works about the fact that he achieved a 
breakthrough to what would become the main tenets of his mature ethics in his Mainz period 
between 1668 and 1672. Though he had not yet found the concise formula of justice as the 
charity of the wise (justitia est caritas sapientis), decisive steps towards it were documented 
in published works, unpublished drafts and private letters from these years. During his later 
career, Leibniz would eventually subsume jurisprudence, ethics, and politics under this 
formula that he considered as the expression of the highest level of his three-grade jus-based 
ethics of strict law, equity and piety, as a result of his creative re-interpretation of the famous 
triplex precepts of Roman Law as to cause no harm, to give to each their due, and to live 
honestly.3 
There are conflicting positions, however, regarding the possibly precise reconstruction 
of the development of Leibniz’s ethics. No consensus has been reached about which texts may 
reveal the decisive step forward, and how. Opinions are particularly divergent about the 
importance of Leibniz’s first political treatise, Specimen Polonorum,4 in this respect.5 I intend 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Naturrechts,“ in “Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ Philosophie 
der Gerechtigkeit, ed. Wenchao Li (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 50. 
3 A path-breaking study is Robert J. Mulvaney, “The Early Development of Leibniz’s 
Concept of Justice,” Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1968): 53–72; a comprehensive 
overview: Hubertus Busche, introduction to Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht, by Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, ed., introd., notes, and with Hans Zimmermann trans. Hubertus Busche 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), xi–cxii; recent accounts: Gregory Brown, “Disinterested love: 
Understanding Leibniz’s reconciliation of self- and other-regarding motives,” British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy 19 (2011): 265–303; Gregory Brown, “Happiness and Justice,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, ed. Maria Rosa Antognazza (Online Publication Date: 
June 2015. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199744725.013.37). 
4 “Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo Rege Polonorum, novo scribendi 
genere ad claram certitudinem exactum”, in: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften 
und Briefe (Darmstadt [later Leipzig, then Berlin]: Reichl [later Akademie-Verlag]) 1923ff. 
[in the following: A] IV, 1, 3–98. The title in Stuart Brown’s translation: “Specimen of 
political demonstrations for the election of a Polish king, completed in the new way of writing 
in order to attain clear certainty.” Stuart Brown, “Leibniz’s formative years (1646–76): an 
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to prove that this text, together with another one of his for the Polish royal election campaign, 
Comparatio propinquitatis Jagellonicae inter Ducem Neoburgicum & Principem 
Lotharingiae [A Comparison of Propinquitiy to the Jagiello stem between the Duke of 
Neuburg and the Prince of Lorraine], are indeed relevant to the applicability of his ethical 
insights to political matters. Nevertheless, I will also demonstrate that the ethical stance of the 
Specimen Polonorum cannot be understood entirely as a precursor of his love-centred ethics 
since the concept of ‘amor’ as conceived in this treatise is not relevant directly from the point 
of view of the formation of Leibniz’s mature ethics. My argument draws, at crucial points, 
upon the polemical context of the Specimen Polonorum, i.e., to its being embedded in the 
debates among the parties of the various candidates during the election campaign. 
 
The Specimen Polonorum between the Nova Methodus and the Elementa Juris Naturalis 
Leibniz’s breakthrough to the ethical standpoint which he would develop further during his 
career consisted of two main elements: the creative reconsideration of the three-grade 
definition of justice in Roman Law, and the formulation of the maxim, ‘Justice is the charity 
of the wise’ with its interpretation as the highest grade of justice. The first appearance of his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
overview,” in The Young Leibniz and His Philosophy (1646–76), ed. Stuart Brown (Dordrecht 
/ Boston / London: Kluwer, 1999), 7n30. 
5 In a recent paper, Gerd van den Heuvel denied any ethical relevance to the occasional 
writings in practical politics from the Mainz period claiming that all they took into 
consideration was sheer power interests. In an earlier work, Hubertus Busche came to the 
conclusion that the link between our own happiness and the happiness of others was 
established in the Specimen Polonorum, while according to a more modest claim of Francesco 
Piro, some elements of the election treatise would be pointing towards the breakthrough by 
emphasizing altruistic love based not on prudence but on wisdom. Gerd van den Heuvel, 
“Theorie und Praxis der Politik bei Leibniz im Kontext der Glorious Revolution und der 
hannoverschen Sukzession,” in Umwelt und Weltgestaltung. Leibniz’ politisches Denken in 
seiner Zeit, ed. Friedrich Beiderbeck et al. (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 511–
526; Hubertus Busche, Leibniz’ Weg ins perspektivische Universum: Eine Harmonie im 
Zeitalter der Berechnung (Hamburg: Meiner, 1997), 357; Francesco Piro, “Leibniz and 
Ethics: The Years 1669–72,” in The Young Leibniz and His Philosophy (1646–76), ed. Stuart 
Brown (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 1999), 160. 
4 
 
basic structure of the spheres or grades of justice can be dated as early as 1667 in the Nova 
Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae. In §§ 73 to 75 of this treatise, Leibniz 
defined the first grade as that of the strict right (jus strictum), the second one as that of equity 
(aequitas), while designating the highest, universal grade of justice in the precept of an 
honest, or pious, life (honestum vivere).6 
Leibniz’s way to the all-encompassing formula of justice as the charity of the wise, as 
well as the question of how its development can be linked to Leibniz’s work on ethics and 
jurisprudence in his Mainz period, is controversial in the Leibniz scholarship. This is not in 
the least due to the fact that the formula appeared rather late in Leibniz’s correspondence, and 
even later in a published work of his.7 Given the lack of such evidence from the Mainz years, 
historians of Leibniz’s thought are seeking for signs of this breakthrough of Leibniz’s 
definitions of the elementary terms of the formula, namely ‘wisdom’ and ‘love.’ It would be 
                                                          
6 Cf., e.g., Hans-Peter Schneider, Justitia Universalis: Quellenstudien zur Geschichte des 
„christlichen Naturrechts” bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
1967), 110–13, 353–468; Albert Heinekamp, Das Problem des Guten bei Leibniz (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1969); Patrick Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence. Justice as the Charity of the 
Wise (Cambridge, Mass. – London, England: Harvard University Press, 1996); Hartmut 
Rudolph, “»Die Achse des Guten« – Grundsätze europäischer Politik zur Abwehr der 
französischen Eroberungskriege,” in Leibniz und Europa (3. Leibniz-Festtage 2006) 
([Hannover 2007]), 32–35; Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 83–84; Francesco Piro, “Rationality of the 
Irregular. Political Communities and Constitutional Devices in Leibniz,” Studia Leibnitiana 
43 (2011): 37–38; Matthias Armgardt, “Die Rechtstheorie von Leibniz im Leicht seiner Kritik 
an Hobbes und Pufendorf,“ in “Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ 
Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit, ed. Wenchao Li (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 15–
16, 20–22; Busche, Leibniz‘ Lehre, 29–53; Stefanie Ertz, “Pietas, Aequitas, Caritas: Einige 
Bemerkungen zur Terminologie und historischen (Übergangs-)Stellung von Leibniz’ 
Naturrecht,“ in “Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ Philosophie 
der Gerechtigkeit, ed. Wenchao Li (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 74. 
7 In publication, the formula ‘justitia est caritas sapientis’ appears so late as in 1693 in 
Leibniz’s Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus (Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, 33). 
To earlier occurrences in unpublished texts, see Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, 
284n24. 
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beyond the scope of the present study to give a comprehensive account of this issue. I shall 
confine myself to scrutinizing the relevance of the Specimen Polonorum within the frame of 
interpretation that Ursula Goldenbaum has given to the problem. According to her position, 
Leibniz achieved the decisive step towards his love-based mature ethics in one of his drafts to 
his Elementa Juris Naturalis from 1670 by finding a way of reconciliation between self-
interest and altruism.8 
The question concerning the possible relevance of the Specimen Polonorum, a political 
treatise written between the Nova Methodus and the drafts belonging to a planned Elementa 
Juris Naturalis, on the road towards Leibniz’s mature ethics, was hitherto posed with 
reference to the second one of the elements mentioned above, i.e., equity. As is known, 
Leibniz worked on the Specimen Polonorum, or more properly speaking, was working on 
texts related to the Polish election campaign amongst which the most important is the 
Specimen Polonorum, “night and day,”9 during the winter of 1668–1669. No direct evidence 
can be found in the text of this treatise that Leibniz took hypotheses of the Nova Methodus 
into consideration; there is one, however, in his Comparatio propinquitatis Jagellonicae inter 
Ducem Neoburgicum & Principem Lotharingiae. Before turning our attention to this text, a 
brief account of the genesis of the Comparatio propinquitatis and the Specimen Polonorum 
with special regard to the aspects relevant to the present subject matter seems necessary here. 
 
Leibinz in Boineburg’s staff for Neuburg’s election campaign 
The election campaign for the Polish throne from the autumn of 1668 till the election on 19th 
June, 1669, was accompanied by an unusually large number of political treatises, pamphlets 
and leaflets, distributed in print form or in hand-written copies.10 I pursue a twofold aim with 
                                                          
8 Ursula Goldenbaum, “It’s Love! Leibniz’s Foundation of Natural Law as the Outcome of 
His Struggle with Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s Naturalism,” in The Philosophy of the Young 
Leibniz, ed. Mark Kulstad et al. (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2009), 189–201. 
9 A IV, 1, xiv. 
10 So far, there is no complete catalogue of them. The most important accounts are Johann 
Gustav Droysen, “Beiträge zur Kritik Pufendorfs,” Berichte über die Verhandlungen der 
Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philologisch-historische 
Classe (1864): I. 61–72; Zygmunt Celichowski, De fontibus qui ad abdicationem J. Casimiri 
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the presentation of the polemics in which the election staff of the Count Palatine Philipp 
Wilhelm von Neuburg, headed by the Baron Johann Christian von Boineburg, was directly 
involved. On the one hand, I aim to support my thesis relying on philological evidence that 
Leibniz in the Comparatio propinquitatis Jagellonicae inter Ducem Neoburgicum & 
Principem Lotharingiae established a link between ethics and politics: the Comparatio 
propinquitatis witnesses Leibniz’s ambitions of binding the Polish election issue to his studies 
in ethics. On the other hand, the reconstruction of the context may support the thesis that in 
the Specimen Polonorum he modified this project and spoke about the concept of ‘amor’ in a 
psychological-emotional sense. 
The Count Palatine of Neuburg had a lifelong love of the Polish throne that remained, 
however, unrequited. He founded his hopes on his first marriage (however unhappy it was, 
from 1642 till 1651) with Anne Catherine Constance Vasa, daughter of Sigismund III Vasa, 
King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania. Besides his renewed efforts to secure a match 
for his daughters with a King of Poland11, he himself aspired for the sceptre of this important 
East European composite state in 1668. 
Leibniz’s participation in the Polish royal election project became a constituent part of 
the formation of his political views during the crucially important Mainz years from 1668 till 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
et electionem Michaëlis Wiśniowiecki pertinent (Dresdae: J. I. Kraszewski, 1871); Tadeusz 
Korzon, Dola i niedola Jana Sobieskiego, Vol. 3 (Kraków: Nakład Akademii Umiejętności, 
1898); Kazimierz Przyboś, “Uwagi o ‘Censurze Candidatorum Sceptri Polonici’ Andrzeja 
Olszowskiego,” Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne (1997, z. 
123): 75–88; Mieczysława Chmielewska, Sejm elekcyjny Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego 
1669 roku (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2006); Adam Przyboś, Michał Korybut 
Wiśniowiecki 1640–1673 (Kraków: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych 
UNIVERSITAS, 2007), 33. 
11 In 1667, Neuburg proposed a marriage between his eldest daughter and the widowed John 
II Casimir and after the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki in 1669, he reiterated his 
proposal to him. Wiktor Czermak, Ostatnie lata Jana Kazimierza. ed., introd. Adam Kersten 
(Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1972), 276–77; Zbigniew Wójcik, Jan 
Kazimierz Waza (Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 
2004), 224. 
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1672.12 Like other political texts of his, from the Securitas politica interna et externa to the 
Consilium Aegyptiacum, the Specimen Polonorum is also closely connected to the principal 
objective of the politics of the Elector of Mainz, the Archbishop Johann Friedrich von 
Schönborn, i.e., to his struggle for the legal reform of the Empire and against French 
expansion on the Rhine.13 Its concrete political goal, the reinforcement of German political 
influence in Poland, in consequence of a due consideration of the weak sovereignty, and 
hence the international vulnerability, of the country, was in perfect harmony with Leibniz’s 
political efforts in Mainz. 
Leibniz took part in the election campaign staff working for Neuburg’s case thanks to 
two different matters. First, due to his acquaintance with the Baron Johann Christian von 
Boineburg who secured him a job in the court of his own patron, the Elector of Mainz. This 
part of Leibniz’s life story is well documented. Boineburg and Leibniz must have become 
acquainted in Frankfurt in late 1667 or in early 1668.14 The Baron encouraged Leibniz to 
present a work of reference to Schönborn which would become his hastily composed and 
published, but even so path-breaking Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque 
Jurisprudentiae. Leibniz was commissioned then to contribute to Schönborn’s law reform and 
was appointed to the High Court of Appeal in Mainz in 1670.15 Besides that, Boineburg and 
Leibniz provided an unofficial but well received support of Schönborn’s French politics in the 
context of which Lebniz’s most important political treatises from his Mainz period, the 
Securitas politica interna et externa as well as his Consilium Aegyptiacum were written.16 
                                                          
12 See, e. g., Kurt Hildebrandt, Leibniz und das Reich der Gnade (Haag: Nijhoff, 1953), 37. 
13 Cf. Peter Schröder, “Reich versus Territorien? Zum Problem der Souveränität im Heiligen 
Römischen Reich nach dem Westfälischen Frieden,” in Altes Reich, Frankreich und Europa. 
Politische, philosophische und historische Aspekte des französischen Deutschlandbildes im 
17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Olaf Asbach et al. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 123–43. 
14 Among many other accounts, e.g. Paul Ritter, Leibniz ägyptischer Plan (Darmstadt: Otto 
Reichl, 1930), 17 and 177–80; Busche, Leibniz, 168–73; Antognazza, Leibniz, 85–87. 
15 Ursula Goldenbaum, “Ein Lutheraner am katholischen Kurmainzischen Hof,” in Leibniz 
und die Ökumene, ed. Wenchao Li et al. (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), 19–20. 
16 Paul Wiedeburg, Der junge Leibniz, das Reich und Europa. I. Teil: Mainz 
(Darstellungsband und Anmerkungsband) (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1962). 
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The circumstances of a second, equally important, factor leading to Lebniz’s new 
commission, namely when and how Leibniz’s new-found mentor and friend Boineburg was 
appointed as Neuburg’s special envoy for the Warsaw election diet, are, however, rather 
unexplored. This intriguing story cannot be narrated here in detail. The point is that during the 
spring and early summer of 1668, Schönborn’s politics towards Louis XIV, the Count 
Palatine of Neuburg, and the Elector of Brandenburg Friedrich Wilhelm reached a phase that 
resulted in the rehabilitation (but not restitution in his office) of his former minister 
Boineburg, disgraced and for a short time imprisoned in 1664. It was due to this transient 
constellation that Schönborn approved of Boineburg’s appointment as election envoy of 
Neuburg by the Elector of Brandenburg who was pulling the strings in the hope and interest 
of Neuburg’s election as King of Poland. Hence, Boineburg’s mission and Leibniz’s treatise 
as parts of it were connected to Schönborn’s politics against the expansion of Louis XIV 
along the Rhine; yet in the Polish issue Boineburg could pursue his own goals and ambitions 
as well. 
Boineburg was appointed as special envoy of Neuburg in early summer of 1668 in the 
expectation of John II Casimir’s upcoming abdication and the start of the election campaign 
and his mission with it in the month of July. However, the abdication did not take place until 
16th September, 1668. In addition, the pro-Muscovite mood among the Polish nobility17, the 
rivalry of leading European monarchs for the influence over Poland, and Neuburg’s 
overzealous efforts to secure as many crowned supporters of his case as possible18 impeded 
the convocation of the election diet and, consequently, Boineburg’s Warsaw mission too for 
several months. Boineburg and his entourage departed for Poland as late as on the 11th of 
April, 1669.19 
The situation of Neuburg’s electoral legate was a peculiar one. Boineburg had just 
been entrusted with a task for which he, as a freshly re-activated fallen courtier and a former 
diplomat in the service of the Western and Swedish politics of the Holy Roman Empire, 
possessed neither power nor specific knowledge enough. During the months of patience the 
                                                          
17 Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Brandenburg. Vol 12, ed. Ferdinand Hirsch (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), 375. 
18 Czermak, Ostatnie, 297. 
19 See the diary of a page in Boineburg’s entourage: Journale avec la description du voyage 
en Pologne, fol. 3r. (Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, CE 8˚ 30). 
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Baron could see only one way to promote Neuburg’s case and this was the debate conducted 
in pamphlets among the rival parties in which he and his assistants, Leibniz among them, 
decided to participate with great verve. 
In the last months of 1668, the Polish nobility held a heated discussion whether a 
foreign king should be elected to their throne again or they should favour a national Polish 
candidate this time. In the first wave of brochures at the end of 1668, Boineburg and his 
amanuenses, from the very beginnings impersonalizing a Polish nobleman, argued for a 
foreign king in general and for Neuburg’s suitability in particular. They advocated the idea of 
a foreign king in the pamphlet Apologia pro fortissima Polonorum gente Extraneis Regibus, 
Non sine summo conservandae libertatis arcano hactenus feliciter usa [An Apology of 
Foreign Kings to the most powerful Polish Nation, hitherto using this institution happily, 
together with the most important secret of conserving the liberty], responding to the Polish 
brochure Exemplum litterarum ab equite Polono ad amicum intimae admissionis de currente 
anno 1668 datarum in quibus de eligendo Piasto sive indigena disputatur [A Copy of a 
confidently communicated letter from a Polish Nobleman to a Friend, dated from the running 
year of 1668, in which the question of the election of a Piast, that is native, King is 
discussed].20 Furthermore, to an attack on Neuburg’s eligibility by a still unknown author they 
responded in Refutatia Objectiej dla ktorych się zda że Xiąże JEo Mść Neoburski inter 
Candidatos Korony Polskiey być nie może [Refusal of the objections according to which it 
seems that the Duke of Neuburg cannot be among the candidates for the Polish Crown]. The 
campaign activity of the camp of Charles, Duke of Lorraine was meant to be neutralised by 
Leibniz’s genealogical tract Comparatio propinquitatis. 
Besides refuting the arguments of others, the staff in Mainz opened, still at the end of 
1668, a further, wider front by comparing the suitability of all candidates running then for the 
Polish throne in the pamphlets Ad Serenissimam Rempublicam Poloniae, Fidelium 
Polonorum fida paraenesis [A faithful admonishing of trusted Polish noblemen to the most 
serene Republic of Poland] and Trutina Variorum Regni poloniae Candidatorum [A balance 
of various candidates for the Kingdom of Poland]. 
                                                          
20 A copy of the original in the Riksarkivet Stockholm is found in Archiwum Główne Akt 
Dawnych, Warsaw, Extranea 143. IX Polen; cf. Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana 
Kazimierza Wazy 1648–1668. Publicystyka – eksorbitancje – memoriały, Vol. 3: 1665–1668, 
ed. Stefania Ochmann-Staniszewska (Warszawa: Volumen, 1991), 285. 
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The campaign against the Prince of Condé and the Duke of Lorraine proved to be a 
fatal misstep for Neuburg’s cause by provoking a powerful response – but not from the side of 
those who were under attack. It was the Trutina that resulted in the voluminous refutation by 
the Polish Vice-Chancellor and Bishop of Chełmno, Andrzej Olszowski in his Censura 
Candidatorum, Sceptri Polonici [Censorship of the candidates for the Sceptre of Poland]. 
Olszowski, whose work became Leibniz’s principal target in the Specimen Polonorum, was 
by no means unknown in Mainz. Taking part in the imperial election in Frankfurt in 1658 as a 
legate of Poland, Olszowski asked in his speech before the Elector of Mainz for his mediation 
in the war between Poland and Sweden.21 Boineburg, who had a copy of Olszowski’s speech 
in his library22, must have met him at that occasion.23 Between 1664 and 1666, Olszowski 
lived in Bad Schwalbach, not far from Mainz.24 He was an old enemy of the Elector of 
Brandenburg.25 His Censura Candidatorum, advocating the election of a national-Polish, 
“Piast” candidate more straightforwardly than its author did it during the election campaign, 
had a great impact on the outcome of the events. 
Within a general anti-foreigner mood, the earlier Apologia elaborated the image of a 
benevolent Neuburg waiting modestly for an opportunity to arise to do even more good deeds 
for his beloved Polish than he had done so far. Against those who opposed a foreign king in 
general, this pamphlet could argue that there were good foreigners indeed. In response to 
arguments against foreign rulers, Boineburg’s staff could remind their antagonists that, on the 
one hand, such arguments could be formulated against a ruler of native origin as well since 
                                                          
21 Władysław Czapliński, “Andrzej Olszowski h. Prus,” in Polski Słownik Biograficzny. Vol. 
24 (Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków – Gdańsk: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1979), 42. 
22 Expositiones Coràm Eminentissimo Domino Electore Moguntino a Sacrae Regiae 
Maiestatis Poloniae & Sueciae Ablegato D. Andrea Olszowski &c. verbo & scripto factae. 
Francofurti ad Moenum 18. Maij. 1658. Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, Sign. 03 - Hsl. 8° 
01853, after Nr. 11. 
23 Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Vol. 3 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1902), 55; 
Heinrich Schrohe, Johann Christian von Boineburg: Kurmainzer Oberhofmarschall, Mainz: 
Joh. Falk 3 Söhne, 1926), 10. 
24 Czapliński, Olszowski, 43. 
25 Urkunden und Aktenstücke, 387; Anna Kamińska, Brandenburg–Prussia and Poland. A 
Study in Diplomatic History (1669–1672) (Marburg/Lahn: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1983), 8–20. 
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they criticized the general character of power and of human nature. On the other hand, they 
could claim that Neuburg was an exception. 
In the Trutina, this rather principle-based argumentation was substituted by a merit- 
and suitability-based one for it was impossible to argue against the Prince of Condé and the 
Duke of Lorraine, both foreigners as well as Neuburg was, along this dividing line between 
Polish and non-Polish. That was the reason why Boineburg and his secretaries introduced 
their eligibility tests, founding their counter-campaign on the Duke of Lorraine’s being too 
young and inexperienced, on the Prince of Condé’s debauchery and dependence on Louis 
XIV, and on the Muscovite candidate’s being non-Catholic. 
Olszowski recognized that the suitability race can be turned against Neuburg too, since 
the German candidate’s advanced age and disquietingly great number of off-springs promised 
a king far from being the ideal for the Polish nobility in need of a ruler who would keep the 
command of the army for himself while leaving the leading offices to them. From 
Olszowski’s point of view, the principal gain of this move consisted in protecting the Polish-
Piast candidate against the spiralling black propaganda since his identity was undefined yet. 
Even if Olszowski did mention the name of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (the future 
Michael I), he was too unknown a figure to be worth attacking in person. 
It was Olszowski who had reduced the number of the candidates who would merit 
either support or criticism to five, i.e., to the Muscovite candidate, to the Count Palatine of 
Neuburg, Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Condé, Charles Duke of Lorraine and the Polish 
national candidate.26 While Leibniz’s Specimen Polonorum discussed the same persons as 
Olszowski’s Censura Candidatorum, other pamphlets dealt with different candidates in 
different groupings. 
                                                          
26 „Neque sine ratione Candidatorum numerum ad quinque personas redigo, de pluribus 
hactenus nondum audito, & vanum censeo laborare ingenio, & conatu, pro illis, qui de 
Poloniae Sceptro nihil laborant, aut callidiore consilio in occulto latent, ut ostentâ mox 
fortunae spe, distractos defessosque Polonorum animos, & suffragia gratâ novitate in se 
vertant, novique et recentes tollant sceptrum.” [Andrzej Olszowski,] Censura Candidatorum, 
Sceptri Polonici (S. l.: s. d. [1669]), fol. a4 r. 
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Olszowski, while trying to guard his anonymity, sent two copies of his Censura 
Candidatorum to Mainz.27 Boineburg and his staff were counter-attacked by their own 
weapons. After Olszowski’s response, they had to go into a defensive position, spending a 
great deal of their efforts to clear Neuburg from the accusations, well-founded or not. In this 
new phase of the debate two, somewhat lengthy, pamphlets were written to discredit 
Olszowski’s allegations by the end of February 1669: Censura Censurae Candidatorum 
Sceptri Polonici [A Censorship of the Censorship of the candidates for the Sceptre of 
Poland], and Leibniz’s second, this time much more ambitious, treatise, the Specimen 
Polonorum. 
In early April 1669, while Leibniz remained in Mainz to return to his philosophical 
and juridical investigations, Boineburg went to Warsaw not only to negotiate, intrigue, and 
bribe in Neuburg’s interest but also to continue the debate through brochures with the 
partisans of the Duke of Lorraine using the same printing facility as his adversaries. To these 
writings belong his election speech entitled Propositio Legati Serenissimi Ducis Neoburgici 
[A Proposal of the Legate of the Most Serene Duke of Neuburg] and a further apology of 
Neuburg, Ducis Neoburgici ad Poloniae Sceptrum aspirantis & á multis iniquè traducti iusta 
defensio [A Just Defence of the Duke of Neuburg, aspirant for the Sceptre of Poland and 
unjustly calumniated by many]. 
 
The Comparatio propinquitatis and the Nova Methodus, § 74 
It was Leibniz’s genealogical tract from the early phase of the campaign that established a 
link between his systematic studies in jurisprudence and the occasional issue of Polish 
politics. The Comparatio propinquitatis is not unknown for scholars of Leibniz’s work. The 
editor of the third edition of volume one of the series IV (Political Writings) of the Akademie 
Ausgabe, Margot Faak, has proved Leibniz’s extended borrowings from this text to his 
Specimen Polonorum and argued for the probability of Leibniz’s authorship on this basis.28 
The introductory paragraphs of it contain a strong, external evidence of Leibniz’s authorship 
                                                          
27 Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, 03 – Hsl. 8o 01853 (04); 03 – Jus.K 8o 00316 (19). 
28 A IV, 1 [31983], 582. 
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in a sentence with a closely parallel wording to that of § 74 of Nova Methodus, being, 
consequently, a proof of Leibniz’s legally based ethical concern for the Polish issue: 
“What is being said here is not about right but rather on equity; not about right in the 
strict but rather in a wide sense; not about faculty but rather about aptitude, as ancient 
lawyers put it. Thence, Neuburg does not claim that he be owed by anyone even the 
slightest thing due to his consanguinity and affinity [with the Jagiellonians]. It is only 
because the [Duke of] Lorraine is boasting of I do not know what genealogies and 
pictures, sending them around Poland, that he finds it proper to inform the world about 
his ties with the Jagiello origin too, which ties, being more splendid because by three 
titles stronger, are thereupon closer, i.e., are the next [in the succession]. We do 
acknowledge and respect in the noble Republic of Poland, not being bound by any 
bond or chain of [hereditary] succession, the perfect liberty to elect [a King]. But the 
freedom of will does not draw off the command of understanding. Understanding is 
directed by reason. Reason, however, together with the manner of the peoples, a 
custom hitherto respected by the Polish, if they do not order, nevertheless advice, not 
to go apart from the stem, blood, family so long as it is not extinct.”29 
                                                          
29 Comparatio propinquitatis, A1. „Quicquid hîc dicetur, non de jure, sed aequitate, non de 
jure aut merito strictè, sed laxè sumto; non de facultate sed aptitudine, uti veteres Jurisconsulti 
loquebantur, intelligendum est. Neque enim Neoburgicus urget, ex consanguinitate & 
affinitate sibi deberi quicquam vel tantillum; solùm quia Lotharingus nescio quas Genealogias 
& imagines jactat, & per universam Poloniam circummittit, decorum putat, orbi & suam cum 
Jagellonicâ origine copulam enotescere, quae cum luculentior ac triplici nomine fortior, tum 
propior est seu proximior. Agnoscimus námque veneramúrque in Augustâ Rep. Polonicâ, 
nullis successionum vinculis catenisve obnoxiâ, summam eligendi libertatem. Sed libertas 
voluntatis non exuit imperium intellectûs. intellectus ratione ducitur. ratio autem ac mos 
gentium, cum Polonis servata hactenus consuetudo, non jubent quidem, suadent tamen, à 
stirpe, sanguine, familiâ non discedi, quamdiu ipsa sibi non deest.” Except where otherwise 
noted, translations are my own. 
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Thus, in the Comparatio propinquitatis, Leibniz revisited the question of equity defined in § 
74 of the Nova Methodus as right in a wider sense and equated the relation of equity to right 
to that, in terms of Grotius’s distinction, between aptitude and faculty:30 
„§74. „Equity or equality, that is, the ratio or proportion between two or more [rights 
claims], consists in harmony or congruence. This coincides with the principles of 
Aristotle, Grotius, and Felden. This requires that for he who harms me, no murderous 
war is perpetuated, but rather restitution. A rule for the judge is to be used: what you 
do not want for yourself, do not do to another; likewise, it follows that not so much 
imprudence but rather deceit and wickedness are to be punished; and likewise, the 
deceptive points of a contract may be annulled, and persons taken advantage of may be 
aided. For the rest, equality itself requires that strict right be observed. Here belongs 
Hobbes’ injunction for peace. But equality provides only right in the wide sense, or 
according to Grotius an aptitude for acquisition, which imposes on the other the full 
obligation [not to impede it]. For example, it is equitable that the one who through 
deceitful practices has removed a debt owed to me, nevertheless still owes me, 
although the legal process of pursuing the debt is not given to me; to take some action 
or make some exception or petition derives from pure right (unless some law is 
added). Nevertheless, that person is obligated to give me what I am owed. Hence this 
precept: give to each his due. But the law or superior makes way for equity, and from 
this sometimes provides for legal action or exception.”31 
                                                          
30 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, I, 1, 4; cf. Yves-Charles Zarka, “Le droit naturel selon 
Leibniz,“ in La notion de nature chez Leibniz, ed. Martine de Gaudemar (Stuttgart: Steiner, 
1995 ), 185–86; Busche, Leibniz’ Lehre, 37; Ertz, Pietas, 76. 
31 Christopher Johns’s translation: Christopher Johns, The Science of Right in Leibniz’s Moral 
and Political Philosophy (London / New Delhi / New York / Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
161–62. „§ 74. Aequitas seu aequalitas, id est, duorum pluriumve ratio vel proportio consistit 
in harmonia seu congruentia. Et coincidit cum Principiis Aristotelis, Grotii et Feldeni: Haec 
requirit, ut in eum qui me laesit, non bellum internecinum instituam, sed ad restitutionem; 
arbitros admitti, quod tibi nolis, alteri non faciendum; item ut puniatur non tàm imprudentia, 
quàm dolus et malitia; item ut infirmentur contractus subtiles, et circumventis subveniatur. De 
caetero Jus strictum observari ipsa aequitas jubet. Huc pertinent Hobbii dispositiones ad 
pacem. Sed aequitas dat solùm Jus laxè dictum, seu Grotii stylo aptitudinem uni; alteri verò 
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In the Comparatio propinquitatis, Leibniz’s argument is based on an analogy with the 
example of the honest creditor and the deceitful debtor mentioned in § 74 of Nova Methodus. 
As the example shows, in case of equity it is up to the superior to decide between rivalling 
right claims. Now, in Poland this “superior” is the nobility. The short-changed creditor was 
supposed to be Neuburg, while the Duke of Lorraine could be considered as the debtor who 
deceitfully made use of the juridical subtlety to argue for his genealogical proximity to the 
Jagiellos. That is why he “boasts of” (“jactat”) his propinquity to the Jagiello House, i.e., he 
claims a right he clearly does not possess. Against the Duke of Lorraine’s machinations, 
Neuburg could devise no legal means; the “superior,” however, can “make way to equity” by 
substantiating Neuburg’s claim. In order to achieve this, Leibniz exhorted the sovereign 
Polish nobility to use their rationality and decide in Neuburg’s favour. Moreover, the 
paragraphs under question show that for Leibniz the stance of the Polish nobility exemplified 
the voluntarism against which he wanted to develop his ethics.32 
 
The concept of ‘amor’ in the Specimen Polonorum: emotional, not jurisprudential 
As his position in the Comparatio propinquitatis shows, Leibniz’s first intention must have 
been to regard the Polish king election issue on the second grade, that of equity, of his law-
based ethical research. The arguments of the Specimen Polonorum, however, as we will see, 
were connected to the first grade of justice, to that of strict right. The words ’facultas’ and 
’aptitudo’ did not occur in the Specimen Polonorum, though the bulk of the genealogical 
argumentation was integral to it. The rational election (“Electio non per SORTEM, sed 
rationalis esto”), as Leibniz conceived it, regarded aspects of the candidates’ suitability, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
obligationem plenam, v. g. Aequum est, ut qui dolosis subtilitatibus se à meo debito liberavit, 
mihi nihilominus teneatur, sed mihi non datur in eum actio persequendi; actio enim vel 
exceptio, vel quaecunque postulatio ex Jure mero descendit (nisi aliquid Lex addat), ille 
tamen est obligatus ut mihi det. Hinc illud praeceptum: Suum cuique tribuere. Sed Lex aut 
Superior dat aequitati exitum, et ex ea nonnunquam actionem vet exceptionem tribuit.” A VI, 
1, 343–44. 
32 Cf. Patrick Riley, “Leibniz and Modernity: against the ‘voluntarism’ of Calvin, Descartes, 
Hobbes and Spinoza,” in Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, ed. Juan Antonio 
Nicolás (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010), 41; Zarka, Le droit, 183. 
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namely utility, virtues, and “probability,” i.e., which candidate is worth trying.33 Thus, the 
argument was not founded on the assumption that aptitude (dignity) can shift into right claim 
but on Neuburg’s fitness to the throne of Poland. 
Nonetheless, what Leibniz rejected explicitly was not the application of the second but 
rather of the third grade, that of the pious, God-directed life to the Polish issue. As it became 
more clearly visible on the basis of what had been said before, Proposition VIII of this treatise 
was nothing else but the rejection of a possible application of the precepts of piety of Nova 
Methodus to the Polish context: 
„Hence, what useful is for the nobility of Poland, is just. But, one may ask, what if 
noblemen brought the plebeians in a hopeless situation, if they treated them like 
beasts, if they converted liberty into licentiousness – would be all this a just thing as 
well? Not at all; the Cossacks had taught us by a sorrowful example that this is in 
reality not useful for the noblemen either. And above, we have restrained liberty for 
security’s sake and this is not compatible with violent licentiousness.”34 
 
Hence, in Proposition VIII there was an implicit reference to § 75 of Nova Methodus 
i.e., to the third grade of justice, namely to the interdiction of the abuse of beasts and 
creatures, concretized in the Polish context as serfs mistreated as beasts.35 Here occurred the 
word ‘justum’ in a rhetorical question showing that Leibniz regarded the Polish king election 
as a situation not subsumed under the rubric of divine justice. According to Leibniz’s 
                                                          
33 Prop. XIX–XX; A IV, 1, 18–19. 
34 „Ergo quod Poloniae Nobilitati utile, id justum est. At, inquies, quid si Nobiles plebem ad 
incitas redigant, bestiarum numero habeant, libertatem in licentiam vertant, an hoc quoque 
justum erit? minimè verò, sed hoc ne ipsis quidem Nobilibus reverà utile esse, Cosacci tristi 
exemplo docuerunt; libertatem quoque securitatis curâ supra fraenavimus, quae ingruente 
licentia constare non potest.” A IV, 1, 10. 
35 „Hinc coincidit utilitas generis humani, imò decor et harmonia mundi, cum voluntate 
divina. Ex hoc principio jam ne bestiis quidem et creaturis abuti licet” (A VI, 1, 344). „Here 
[i.e., in the third grade of justice], coincides the utility of humankind, indeed, the beauty and 
harmony of the world, with the divine will. From this principle it is never permitted to abuse 
beasts and creatures.” Qtd. after Johns, Science of Right, 162. Cf. Busche, Leibniz’ Lehre, 42. 
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suggestion, there was no beauty nor harmony in the Kingdom of Poland because the Polish 
nobility did not make efforts to bring its liberty into harmony with the divine order. 
This comparison between Proposition VIII of the Specimen Polonorum and § 75 of the 
Nova Methodus may prove sufficiently that Leibniz intended to ponder the Polish issue within 
the theoretical frame of his research into jurisprudence. But the explanation of why Leibniz 
did not consider the Polish election issue from the perspective of the third grade of justice 
does, of course, not explain in itself why he renounced in the Specimen Polonorum of 
applying the second grade of equity to it as in the Comparatio propinquitatis. In this decision 
he might have been prompted by Olszowski’s severe opinion about the Germans and their 
hatred towards the Polish: 
„Neuburg’s way to the Kingdom is obstructed by his being a German Prince. I have 
learnt from a great author, Maximilian Fredro, Castellan in Lviv, an eminent man in 
writing and politics an objection against Ernst of Austria saying that he was from the 
German people, which nation hated the Polish from birth.”36 
Leibniz’s concern with love originated in the Specimen Polonorum in the mistrust of 
the Polish against Neuburg about which he read in Olszowski. He could easily recognize that 
the main obstacle in the way of Neuburg’s election was emotional. His course of action was 
clear before him: deter the antipathy from Neuburg and reverse the public mood by some way 
into love. Leibniz had to renounce the juridical approach because Olszowski had made it clear 
that the Polish nobility as a sovereign was not only an arbitrary but also an antagonist which 
fact made the analogy established in the Comparatio propinquitatis untenable. 
In his letter to Hermann Conring from 13th/23rd January, 1670, Leibniz revisited the 
Grotian distinction between jus strictum and jus laxe sumptum and made an important 
addition saying that just strictum should belong to the sphere of the ethics, i.e., to the 
interpretation of law, while jus laxe sumptum, i.e., equity, would make out the sphere of 
                                                          
36 „Obstruit Neoburgico aditum Regni, Principem Germaniae esse. Magno auctore didici 
Maximiliano Fredro Castellano Leopolien[si], eminenti in literis & Republicâ Viro obiectum 
id Ernesto Austriaco, quòd è populis Germanis oriundus esset, quae gens natale fert odium in 
Polonos.” Olszowski, Censura, fol. B2 v. There are marginal notes in the chapter on Neuburg 
in one of the copies of Olszowski’s work in the Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt (03 - Hsl. 8° 
01853 (04)), with special attention to these emotional statements. 
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politics where law is being created.37 In this context, stepping back to the first grade of justice 
in the Specimen Polonorum should mean that he was not expecting political action, i.e., 
legislation, in Neuburg’s interest any more but his starting point was his insisting to the 
existing law. 
The striving for avoiding harm and damage belonged to the first grade. Politics, 
however, belonged to the second grade since, in contractual terms, the grade of the strict law 
posited people in the state of nature while they are considered in the second one as united in a 
political community. As Leibniz formulated in the same letter to Conring: „To this one [i.e., 
to the first grade] belongs the legal percept of not doing harm to anyone, or avoiding harm 
[…] That one [i.e., the first grade] posits humans in the state of nature (i.e., outside of a 
political community), this one [i.e., the second grade] conjuncts them in a political 
community.”38 In this context, the reason becomes clear why Leibniz posited Neuburg’s (but 
also the other candidates’) case on the first grade of the justice. With relation to the Polish 
political community, they are in the state of nature since they are not members of it. Since 
they are not bound by the laws and rules of this community, they are solely able to do harm or 
benefit to it. Now, persons who cause harm to the community exclude themselves from it39; 
and, logically enough, those harming it from the outside are not eligible to be members of it 
let alone be endowed with a higher office.40 
According to the definition of ‘amare’ in Proposition XXXVII, love is nothing else but 
finding delight in others’ benefit.41 In an inserted Corollary about the connection between 
benefit and love, Leibniz intended to prove that because of his benefits, Neuburg merited to 
                                                          
37 “Scientia autem juris naturae, de qua Grotius, Hobbes, Feldenus, Pufendorfius, Ethica est, 
de justo, eoque ut Grotius vocat stricte dicto; scientia Nomothetica de condendis Legibus, 
Politica est, de Utili, sed in commune, seu de aequo, vel ut Grotius vocat jure laxe dicto (ad 
quod in me est obligatio, sed in altero non est actio seu jus exigendi.” A II, 1, 46. Cf. Ertz, 
Pietas, 97. 
38 „Illuc pertinet praeceptum juris de neminem laedando, seu damno vitando. […] Illa 
homines discriminat in statu naturali (id est extra civitatem) positos, haec conjungit in 
civitatem.” A II, 1, 47. 
39 A IV, 1, 8 and 14. 
40 E.g. A IV, 1, 55 and 72. 
41 „Amare est delectare alterius bonis.” A IV, 1, 34. 
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be loved.42 Hence, the interpretation of love was utilitarian. We love those from whom we can 
expect more good or benefit. A contrary notion of love, unsurprisingly enough, is hatred.43 
‘Amor’ was the integrating concept in the Specimen Polonorum: Neuburg’s personal qualities 
would have brought utility and benefits to the Polish people; these benefits were proofs of 
Neuburg’s love towards them since he did them good in order to delight himself in their good. 
In accordance with this, friendship is nothing else but mutual love in the Polish 
election treatise. The Polish are glad of Neuburg’s good and he is glad of their good. On this 
mutual basis, Neuburg could expect the Polish nobility to return his benefits towards them by 
doing him the favour of electing him. Hence, love is based in this treatise not on the Christian 
interpretation of the term but rather on its linkage to the concept of favour so far as to love 
someone means nothing else but to favour them for their beneficent deeds. A true friend is 
altruistic, i.e., sees the good of the other.44 Because there is no self-love in the ethical 
vocabulary of the Specimen Polonorum but only altruism, Leibniz needs the reciprocity to 
make everyone happy. 
 
Leibniz’s early reading of Hobbes and his ethical stance in the Specimen Polonorum 
In his Polish election treatise, Leibniz excluded the possibility of interpreting phenomena of 
Polish politics on the level of equity. It may remain true that Leibniz situated politics on the 
second grade of his three-grade system of justice in general but it was on the first grade in this 
case to remain there over the whole of the security-centred Mainz period. This is not 
surprising in the light of the fact that security belonged to the lowest grade of justice as 
Leibniz’s addendum to § 74 of the Nova Methodus on his own copy made it clear: „Altior 
                                                          
42 Cf. A IV, 1, 45: “Ergo Neoburgicus eâ re non odium, sed amorem meretur”. Olszowski 
took stance in this issue in the following terms: „We renounce this inopportune love and 
favour of Neuburg towards Poland; it is not necessary to do a favour to those who would 
detest it.” „Amori et favori [scil. Neoburgici] in Poloniam non opportuno; spontè renunciamus 
nec invisis beneficium conferri necesse habetur.” Olszowski, Censura, fol. A2 r. 
43 A IV, 1, 49. 
44 “Verus Amicus Amici bona per se expetit.” A IV, 1, 34; “Verè Amicus magnum bonum 
alterius parvo suo praefert.” A IV, 1, 35. 
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[than the first grade] est juris gradus, qvo non tantùm hominum securitati, sed et mutuo 
commodo consulitur.”45 
Leibniz seems to be making efforts to reconcile the Aristotelian concept of ‘finis’ as 
an ideal goal with the more realistic Grotian definition of this concept in De jure belli ac pacis 
as ‘safety and security’ (salus atque securitas).46 To develop this realistic proposal in the 
Specimen Polonorum, Leibniz chose a hedonistic ethics.47 As Maria Rosa Antognazza has 
already noticed it, Leibniz made a distinction between the immediate goal of a state which he 
called its scope (scopus) and its ultimate aim, i.e., its finis.48 Poland’s immediate goal 
consisted in liberty and security49 which in practice meant that Polish liberty should be 
constrained by the needs of security.50 The final aim of any political community must be 
happiness51 which he defined, in conformity with his hedonistic standpoint, as the presence of 
pleasure and the absence of pain.52 In Poland’s case, this means, realistically interpreted, the 
absence of evil. 
The paramount importance of security, however, did not exclude a due consideration 
of ethical issues in general and that of “political” love in particular in the Specimen 
Polonorum. This treatise is indeed part and parcel of Leibniz’s “loud” thinking with pen at 
hand over the foundations of ethics in his Mainz years. Beginning this intellectual process 
even earlier in his De Arte Combinatoria from 1666, Leibniz argued for the desirability of 
finding the mean between love and hatred.53 In other words, he offered a theory of affects in 
                                                          
45 A VI, 1, 343. 
46 II, 17-18. Elsewhere, Grotius writes about „securitas atque tranquillitas” and „publica 
tranquillitas vel securitas” (II, 40). To the central concept of ‘security’ in Leibniz’s thought 
see Luca Basso, “The Republic in Leibniz: Between Philosophy and Politics,” Studia 
Leibnitiana 43 (2011): 115n43. 
47 Cf. Piro, Leibniz and Ethics, 155–56. 
48 Antognazza, Leibniz, 115. 
49 “scopus Reipublicae Polonicae libertas et securitas esse debet” A IV, 1, 8. 
50 “libertas securitate fraenata” A, IV, 1, 7. 
51 “[f]inis est felicitas” A IV, 1, 7. 
52 “Felicitas est praesentia bonorum, absentia malorum, quanta haberi potest” A IV, 1, 7. 
53 „Justitia (particularis) est virtus servans mediocritatem circa affectus hominis erga 
hominem, juvandi et nocendi, seu favorem et odium. Regula mediocritatis est: licere eò usque 
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an Aristotelian mould. Thus, Leibniz posited justice in connection with the affects to arrive at 
a theologically coloured re-interpretation of Thrasymachus’s position.54 As we will see below, 
it was in the Specimen Polonorum that he broke with this position declaring that the mid-way 
between them must be excluded and, hence, making an important step towards his 
engagement with love as the fundamental concept of his ethics. 
In his drafts for the Elementa Juris Naturalis, as Ursula Goldenbaum noticed it, 
Leibniz “follows Hobbes in defining the good as that which will be strived for [conatur] and 
the bad as that which will be avoided.”55 Without paying special attention to the term 
‘conatus’, Leibniz’s position was similar in the Specimen Polonorum where he defined the 
concepts of ’good’ and ’bad’ in a Hobbesian vein. This solution shows that attributing the 
basic dispositions of striving for good and avoiding evil to humans could be a perfectly 
workable hypothesis without embedding it any kind of natural philosophy. 
In the Specimen Polonorum, Leibniz did ask the question: What is the good?56 He 
deployed the answer in three steps. First, he put forward that the answer would be a prudential 
one.57 Next, he gave some examples of good things in honest, cheerful, and useful ones 
(honestum, jucundum, utile).58 Finally, the reader was given a Hobbesian definition of what 
the good is: “Bonum est, quod appetitur.”59 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
alterum (me) juvare, quo usque (alteri) tertio non nocetur.” A VI, 1, 229. Quoted in 
Goldenbaum, It’s love!, 196. 
54 “Quare ostendimus Justitiam et ipsam in affectuum moderatione esse positam. […] Justum 
esse potentiori utile. Nam DEUS propriè et simpliciter est caeteris potentior (homo enim 
homine absolutè potentior non est, cum fieri possit, ut quantumcunque robustus ab infirmo 
occidatur. [...] Igitur Gloriam DEI mensuram omnis juris esse manifestum est.” A VI, 1, 230. 
55 Goldenbaum, It’s love!, 197. To Hobbes’s influence in the Specimen Polonorum and to 
Leibniz’s adoption of the term ‘conatus’ into his own philosophy see Konrad Moll, Der junge 
Leibniz, Vol. 3 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1996), 103–5 and 123–25. 
56 “Restat ergo ut sciat, quod bonum est.” A IV, 1, 22. 
57 “Qui scit, quid bonum sit, prudens est.” A IV, 1, 22; “Prudens debet scire, quid bonum sit.” 
A IV, 1, 24. 
58 A IV, 1, 35. 
59 A IV, 1, 35. 
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More importantly, Leibniz’s definition of evil stayed on a Christianly qualified 
Hobbesian footing as well. He defined the greatest evil in these terms: “The greatest evil is 
eternal death; the greatest political evil is the eternal death of the political community.”60 
Taking into consideration that political death in Hobbes consisted in civil war, we are in a 
better position to understand why Leibniz was playing so much with the gloomy prospect of a 
civil war in Poland. Concerning internal stability61, Leibniz’s arguments drew heavily on 
Hobbes’s views.62 In opposition to Olszowski’s picture of the present of Poland as a 
politically independent, consequently happy, country63, Propositions I and II of the Specimen 
Polonorum depict an unhappy Poland suffering from civil war where quietude and safety are 
of paramount importance. His drawing upon Hobbes’s position concerning the summum 
malum indicates that Leibniz, again in harmony with Hobbes’s views, put the concept of the 
greatest evil, i.e., death into the focus of his ethics rather than that of the summum bonum, i.e., 
happiness. 
In the Specimen Polonorum, Leibniz did not embrace the concept of conatus from 
Hobbes’s philosophy and in harmony with this decision, nor did he adopt his concept of 
happiness and summum bonum as a goal to be pursued endlessly but never to be reached. A 
shift of this position in his ethical research characterises first the fifth draft of the Elementa 
Juris Naturalis.64 In the Specimen Polonorum he seems to have put aside the theoretical 
problems which was the result of relying on Hobbes’s notion of happiness as a never 
attainable summum bonum though the tension had remained palpable ever since his 
Demonstrationum catholicarum conspectus from 1668-1669;65 a work written more or less in 
the same time as the Specimen Polonorum. Leibniz’s dictum saying that „finis est felicitas”66  
                                                          
60 „Aeterna mors summum malum est, civilis civile” A IV, 1, 50. 
61 “securitati internae” A IV, 1, 17. 
62 Luca Basso, “Regeln einer effektiven Außenpolitik: Leibniz‘ Bemühen um eine Balance 
widerstreitender Machtinteressen in Europa,” Studia Leibnitiana 40 (2008): 145. 
63 „Vivimus eâ felicitate incomparabili Poloni, ut Patrimonium non simus, neque Haereditario 
Jure in Principis alicujus personae aut familiae servitium cedamus, sed Dominos ultrò Nobis 
adoptemus, quibus Electis, non serviendum sed parendum sit.” Olszowski, Censura, fol. a2 v. 
64 Edward W. Glowienka, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Harmony, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 
2016), 23. 
65 Ibid. 
66 A IV, 1, 7. 
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left the question concerning the very attainability of this goal open; qualifying felicity as 
„praesentia bonorum, absentia malorum, quanta haberi potest”67 provided, however, a rather 
realistic definition of happiness. 
On the basis of parallel arguments in the second draft of the Elementa Juris Naturalis 
it is easier to explain this lapidary statement on Poland’s felicity. Happiness is another, higher, 
level in the life of a political community; a commonwealth can step forward to this level of 
happiness once the preconditions of security (this central concept in Hobbes’s political 
philosophy68) are fulfilled.69 Security forms, however, an indispensable basis; no state can 
subsist without security. It is characteristic for despotic states as well as for other ones but 
only a ’respublica’ (commonwealth) is able to reach that autarky which provides felicity for 
the citizens.70 Leibniz distinguished between the best kind of state and the best „form” of 
state: this latter is where the citizens are the happiest.71 With this claim he challenged, with 
                                                          
67 Ibid. 
68 See, e. g., Raymond Geuss, Glück und Politik. Potsdamer Vorlesungen, ed. Andrea Kern 
und Christoph Menke, (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2004), 15; see also Raymond 
Geuss, “Happiness and Politics,” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics. Third 
Series. 10 (2002): 15–33. 
69 „Porro si qvis homo aut Concilium ita fortis sit, ut praestare omnibus securitatem possit, 
imò felicem reddere, is jure alios cogere potest, et ab omnibus juvari debet ad communem 
felicitatem.” A VI, 1, 439. 
70 „Respublica est civitas qvae ultra securitatis formam habet formam autarkeias seu 
praebendae felicitatis. Dominatus subsistit intra securitatem. Et hoc est herile et despoticum. 
Nam alioqvi Respublica, in qva forma non est securitatem saltem magnae parti praestantis, 
jam dissoluta est.” A VI, 1, 446. 
71 „Extrinsecè multis utiqve modis, sed qvi ad rem pertineat uno, nimirum cumulo bonitatis, 
atqve accessoriè, si scilicet homines non tantùm in securitatis, sed et aliorum bonorum 
opinione vivant, qvorum maximus gradus est in optima Reipublicae forma, in qva vivunt in 
opinione praestantium sibi felicitatem. Formam hîc voco ipsam externam faciem. Aliud est 
autem Respublica optima, aliud formam habens optimae. Optima est in qva homines vivunt in 
felicitate.” A VI, 1, 446. 
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reference to Poland as an example to the contrary, Hobbes’s view that a state cannot attain 
security without a singular will that expresses the will of the community.72 
On the basis of a parallel argument in the Elementa Juris Naturalis, Neuburg’s 
election programme can be translated in terms of security, autarky, and happiness as follows. 
Poland disposes of autarchy as a basic precondition of prosperous felicity.73 It has, however, 
massive deficit concerning security. Neuburg’s plan, in Leibniz’s interpretation focusing on 
Poland’s domestic and international security, offered exactly what had been missing from the 
country’s felicity. Moreover, this project could be implemented without touching the 
sacrosanct foundations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the republic of the nobility 
and the shared sovereignty among its members: political institutions which Leibniz regarded 
as immovable.74 This is why Neuburg’s option, or so Leibniz hoped, could seem a more 
attractive offer than that of his rivals. The Russian tsarevich, for example, was supposed to 
reinforce the security of the country together with the introduction of despotic political 
institutions while the Prince of Condé proposed to bring not only French military assistance to 
Poland but also French-type, centralised and absolutistic, monarchical power. 
If the concept of ‘conatus’ in the third draft of the Elementa Juris Naturalis attests to 
the fact that Leibniz jotted down this draft after being acquainted with Hobbes’s natural 
philosophy75, then the absence of this concept in the Specimen Polonorum and a non-technical 
usage of the very word shows that this treatise was written before his acquaintance with it.76 
This may explain why Hobbes’s concept of love based on self-interest, which is held by 
Ursula Goldenbaum as the decisive step towards the mature ethics, was missing from it as 
well. In the absence of the concept of a ‘conatus’ uniformly determining humans’ deeds, 
                                                          
72 „Cùm enim nulla sit certitudo securitatis nisi sit voluntas qvaedam certa praestandi, ea 
autem in multitudine esse non possit, necesse est ad perfectionem civitatis esse qvandam 
voluntatem certam qvae pro voluntate civitatis habeatur. Sed hoc non, ut voluit doctissimus 
Hobbius, in omni civitate necessarium est. Ecce enim Poloniam intueamur, nulla in ea seape 
consensus obtinendi ratio.” A VI, 1, 447. 
73 „Nobilitas et per consequens Respublica Polonica sibi sufficit.” Propositio II; A IV, 1, 6. 
74 „Bonum Reipublicae cum bono Nobilitatis in Polonia jure coincidit.” Propositio I; A IV, 1, 
6. 
75 Goldenbaum: It’s love!, 199. 
76 A IV, 1, 39 and 51. 
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Leibniz seems to have held the position of the compatibility of the natural instinct of self-
preservation on the level of the “mortal God,” the state, with altruism concerning the ethical 
motivation of human beings. Hence, he did not have to recur to the reconciliation of self-love 
and altruism by “the natural affect of love.”77 In the Specimen Polonorum, self-love did not 
pose a problem for him, conceiving love exclusively as altruistic. Thus, if the breakthrough of 
the mature ethics consists in this moment, then it could not occur in the treatise on the Polish 
king election because one of its preconditions, namely self-love, was missing still.78 
We can go a step further by asking whether the definition “We love a thing whose 
happiness causes our own pleasure”79 can against the background of what is being said here 
be held as Leibniz’s breakthrough towards his mature ethics. Leibniz’s work of conceptual 
definitions by identical propositions, starting with the Specimen Polonorum, continued in the 
drafts pertaining to his planned Elementa Juris Naturalis. The definition under scrutiny 
belongs to one of these sequences: 
“Prudence is the art of living, i.e., the art of procuring happiness to us.” […] / 
(“Wisdom is the science of happiness.”) [… ] / “Happiness is the state of pleasure 
without any pain.” /”Misery is the state of pain without any pleasure.” / “Pleasure is 
what is being striven for its own sake” / “Pain is what is being avoided for its own 
sake.”  […] / “We love a thing the happiness of which is joyful for us.” / „We hate a 
thing the misery of which is pleasant for us.” / „Friendship is a state of mutual love.” 
[…] / „Damage is the decrease of good.” […] / “Useful is what good is for the reason 
of another thing.” […] / “The presence of good is good; the absence of evil is good.” 
[…] / “The ultimate aim, i.e., the good for its own sake is what is being striven without 
the appetite for another thing.”80 
                                                          
77 Goldenbaum, It’s love!, 200. 
78 To the position of Hubertus Busche concerning this issue and to Ursula Goldenbaum’s 
critique on it, see Goldenbeum, It’s love!, 199n27. 
79 Goldenbaum, It’s love!, 199. 
80 „Prudentia est ars vivendi, seu ars procurandae sibi felicitatis.” […] / („Sapientia est 
scientia felicitatis.”) [… ] / „Felicitas est status voluptatis sine dolore.” /„Miseria est status 
doloris sine voluptate.” / „Voluptas est quod appetitur propter se.” /„Dolor, qvod vitatur 
propter se.” […] / „Amamus rem cuius felicitas nobis jucunda est.” /„Odimus rem cuius 
miseria nobis jucunda est.” / „Amicitia est status mutui amoris.” […] / „Damnum est boni 
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This draft can help us to a better definition of the friendship between Neuburg and the 
Polish people: it was mutual love. As the Specimen Polonorum said, Neuburg merited not 
hatred but rather love.81 To this was added that there was no third way between love and 
hatred. No one could be indifferent.82 It was the definition of ‘amor’ as linked to ‘odium’ 
(“We love a thing the happiness of which is joyful for us.” / „We hate a thing the misery of 
which is joyful for us”) that attached the draft in question to the Specimen Polonorum. Hence, 
to the question of whether the negation of the relevance of the second and third grades of 
Leibniz’s theory of justice in case of the Polish election treatise had any impact on the 
interpretation of the above draft as the text where the breakthrough of the mature ethics was 
supposed to have occurred one can answer as follows. The above-quoted third draft for the 
Elementa Juris Naturalis did contain an important step towards the mature ethics so far as it 
replaced the concept of benefit by that of happiness. It seems, however, to be insufficient for 
signposting it as the moment of the breakthrough of Leibniz’s mature ethics. The context of 
the definition under question shows that the notion of ‘amor’ was interpreted as the contrary 
concept of hatred in terms of human emotions and not with relation to God. The point Leibniz 
celebrated somewhat later in 1671 as his crucial discovery in ethics was, however, not only to 
equate love and justice but also to equate the love towards all men with the love of God.83 
 
Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
decrementum.” […] / „Utile est qvod alterius causa bonum est.” […] / „Praesentia boni bona 
est; absentia mali bona est.” […] / „Finis seu bonum propter se est qvod appetitur nulla ad 
alterius appetitum habita ratione.” A VI, 1, 456–58. 
81 A IV, 1, 45. 
82 “Ergo quem metuimus, nisi amemus, odimus. Haec limitatio necessariò addenda est. 
Alioqui sequeretur, Deum simul timeri et amari non posse: Sic ergo intelligendum: in eum 
quem metuimus, medio inter amorem et odium affectu ferri nos non posse, necessariò vel 
amandum vel et odio prosequendum.” A IV, 1, 49. 
83 First of all, in his letter to Antoine Arnauld, November 1671: “Ostendo, omnem 
obligationem summo conatu absolvi: idem esse amare omnes et amare Deum, sedem 
harmoniae universalis; imo idem esse vere amare, seu sapientem esse, et Deum super omnia 
amare, id est, omnes amare, id est, justum esse.” A II, 1, 280. 
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Among Leibniz’s occasional writings in the Mainz period, it was the Specimen Polonorum 
that established the links between practical politics and theoretical research into ethics and 
metaphysics. Its main outcome, the emphasis on security in politics remained valid in his 
subsequent writings as well. This treatise, together with his preceding text pertaining to the 
Polish royal election campaign, the Comparatio propinquitatis, tested the theory of the Nova 
Methodus in the praxis. This theory proved to be workable so far as a political programme 
could be built upon it without the violation of its principles. However, its disadvantage was 
that this particular political programme could interpret Polish politics only on the first level of 
Leibniz’s three-grade system of right. I intended to prove that Leibniz’s everyday experience 
in the practical school of politics did have impact on his theory, juridical or ethical. Leibniz’s 
occasional political treatises from the Mainz period tested the theory in concrete situations, 
helping to draw the boundary of its applicability and simultaneously to search for a higher 
unity. The most important witness of this knowledge process was the Specimen Polonorum 
being, similarly to the other major political works form these years, like the Securitas publica 
interna et externa or the Consilium Aegyptiacum, a detailed case study in a concrete political 
situation while containing, in contradistinction to them, also theoretical parts closely linked to 
his research into the science of right. 
 
Manuscript sources 
Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt 
Journale avec la description du voyage en Pologne. CE 8˚ 30. 
 
Bibliography 
Antognazza, Maria Rosa. Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
Armgardt, Matthias. “Die Rechtstheorie von Leibniz im Leicht seiner Kritik an 
Hobbes und Pufendorf.“ In “Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ 
Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit, edited by Wenchao Li, 13–27. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
2015. 
28 
 
Basso, Luca. “Regeln einer effektiven Außenpolitik: Leibniz‘ Bemühen um eine 
Balance widerstreitender Machtinteressen in Europa.” Studia Leibnitiana 40 (2008): 139–152. 
Basso, Luca. “The Republic in Leibniz: Between Philosophy and Politics.” Studia 
Leibnitiana 43 (2011): 103–21. 
Brown, Gregory. “Disinterested love: Understanding Leibniz’s reconciliation of self- 
and other-regarding motives.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2011): 265–
303. 
Brown, Gregory. “Happiness and Justice.” In The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, edited 
by Maria Rosa Antognazza, Online Publication Date: June 2015. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199744725.013.37 
Brown, Stuart. “Leibniz’s formative years (1646–76): an overview.” In The Young 
Leibniz and His Philosophy (1646–76), edited by Stuart Brown, 1–18. Dordrecht / Boston / 
London: Kluwer, 1999. 
Busche, Hubertus. Leibniz’ Weg ins perspektivische Universum: Eine Harmonie im 
Zeitalter der Berechnung. Hamburg: Meiner, 1997. 
Busche, Hubertus. Introduction to Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht, by Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, edited with an introduction and notes, and with Hans Zimmermann 
translated by Hubertus Busche, xi–cxii. Hamburg: Meiner, 2003. 
Busche, Hubertus. “Leibniz’ Lehre von den drei Stufen des Naturrechts.“ In “Das 
Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit, 
edited by Wenchao Li, 29–53. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015. 
Chmielewska, Mieczysława. Sejm elekcyjny Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego 1669 
roku. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2006. 
Comparatio propinquitatis Jagellonicae Inter Ducem Neoburgicum et Principem 
Lotharingiae. S. l.: s.d. [1669]. 
Droysen, Johann Gustav. “Beiträge zur Kritik Pufendorfs.” Berichte über die 
Verhandlungen der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. 
Philologisch-historische Classe (1864): 43–120. 
29 
 
Celichowski, Zygmunt. De fontibus qui ad abdicationem J. Casimiri et electionem 
Michaëlis Wiśniowiecki pertinent. Dresdae: J. I. Kraszewski, 1871. 
Czapliński, Władysław. “Andrzej Olszowski h. Prus.” In Polski Słownik Biograficzny. 
Vol. 24, 42–46. Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków – Gdańsk: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 
1979. 
Czermak, Wiktor. Ostatnie lata Jana Kazimierza, edited with an introduction by 
Adam Kersten. Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1972. 
Ertz, Stefanie. “Pietas, Aequitas, Caritas: Einige Bemerkungen zur Terminologie und 
historischen (Übergangs-)Stellung von Leibniz’ Naturrecht.“ In “Das Recht kann nicht 
ungerecht sein…” Beiträge zu Leibniz’ Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit, edited by Wenchao Li, 
69–107. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015. 
Fischer, Kuno. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Vol. 3. Heidelberg: Winter, 1902. 
Geuss, Raymond. “Happiness and Politics.” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the 
Classics. Third Series. 10 (2002): 15–33. 
Geuss, Raymond. Glück und Politik. Potsdamer Vorlesungen, edited by Andrea Kern 
und Christoph Menke. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004. 
Glowienka, Edward W. Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Harmony. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 2016. 
Goldenbaum, Ursula. “It’s Love! Leibniz’s Foundation of Natural Law as the 
Outcome of His Struggle with Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s Naturalism.” In The Philosophy of the 
Young Leibniz, ed. Mark Kulstad, Mogens Lærke, and David Snyder, 189–201. Stuttgart: 
Steiner, 2009. 
Goldenbaum, Ursula. “Ein Lutheraner am katholischen Kurmainzischen Hof.” In 
Leibniz und die Ökumene, edited by Wenchao Li, Hand Poser, and Hartmut Rudolph, 17–32. 
Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013. 
Heinekamp, Albert. Das Problem des Guten bei Leibniz. Bonn: Bouvier 1969. 
Heuvel, Gerd van den. “Theorie und Praxis der Politik bei Leibniz im Kontext der 
Glorious Revolution und der hannoverschen Sukzession.” In Umwelt und Weltgestaltung. 
30 
 
Leibniz’ politisches Denken in seiner Zeit, edited by Friedrich Beiderbeck, Irene Dingel and 
Wenchao Li, 511–526. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015. 
Hildebrandt, Kurt. Leibniz und das Reich der Gnade. Haag: Nijhoff, 1953. 
Johns, Christopher. The Science of Right in Leibniz’s Moral and Political Philosophy. 
London / New Delhi / New York / Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013. 
Kamińska, Anna. Brandenburg–Prussia and Poland. A Study in Diplomatic History 
(1669–1672). Marburg/Lahn: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1983. 
Korzon, Tadeusz. Dola i niedola Jana Sobieskiego, Vol. 3. Kraków: Nakład Akademii 
Umiejętności, 1898. 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Darmstadt [later Leipzig, 
then Berlin]: Reichl [later Akademie-Verlag], 1923ff. 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Political Writings, translated and edited by Patrick Riley. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
Moll, Konrad. Der junge Leibniz, Vol. 3. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-
Holzboog 1996. 
Mulvaney, Robert J. “The Early Development of Leibniz’s Concept of Justice.” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1968): 53–72. 
Olszowski, Andrzej. Censura candidatorum, sceptri Polonici. S. l.: s. d. [1669]. 
Piro, Francesco. “Leibniz and Ethics: The Years 1669–72.” In The Young Leibniz and 
His Philosophy (1646–76), edited by Stuart Brown, 147–167. Dordrecht / Boston / London: 
Kluwer, 1999. 
Piro, Francesco. “Rationality of the Irregular. Political Communities and 
Constitutional Devices in Leibniz.” Studia Leibnitiana 43 (2011): 36–53. 
Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy 1648–1668. 
Publicystyka – eksorbitancje – memoriały, Vol. 3: 1665–1668, edited by Stefania Ochmann-
Staniszewska. Warszawa: Volumen, 1991. 
31 
 
Przyboś, Adam. Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki 1640–1673. Kraków: Towarzystwo 
Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych UNIVERSITAS, 2007. 
Przyboś, Kazimierz. “Uwagi o ‘Censurze Candidatorum Sceptri Polonici’ Andrzeja 
Olszowskiego.” Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne (1997, z. 
123): 75–88. 
Rescher, Nicholas. Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1979. 
Riley, Patrick. Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence. Justice as the Charity of the Wise. 
Cambridge, Mass. – London, England: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Riley, Patrick. “Leibniz and Modernity: against the ‘voluntarism’ of Calvin, Descartes, 
Hobbes and Spinoza.” In Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, edited by Juan Antonio 
Nicolás, 41–48. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010. 
Ritter, Paul. Leibniz ägyptischer Plan. Darmstadt: Otto Reichl, 1930. 
Rudolph, Hartmut. “»Die Achse des Guten« – Grundsätze europäischer Politik zur 
Abwehr der französischen Eroberungskriege.“ In Leibniz und Europa (3. Leibniz-Festtage 
2006), 26–39. [Hannover, 2007.]  
Rutherford, Donald. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Schneider, Hans-Peter. Justitia Universalis: Quellenstudien zur Geschichte des 
„christlichen Naturrechts” bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
1967. 
Schröder, Peter. “Reich versus Territorien? Zum Problem der Souveränität im 
Heiligen Römischen Reich nach dem Westfälischen Frieden.” In Altes Reich, Frankreich und 
Europa. Politische, philosophische und historische Aspekte des französischen 
Deutschlandbildes im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, edited by Olaf Asbach, Klaus Malettke, and 
Sven Externbrink, 123–43. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001. 
Schrohe, Heinrich. Johann Christian von Boineburg: Kurmainzer Oberhofmarschall. 
Mainz: Joh. Falk 3 Söhne, 1926. 
32 
 
Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Brandenburg. Vol 12, edited by Ferdinand Hirsch. Berlin: Reimer, 1892. 
Wiedeburg, Paul. Der junge Leibniz, das Reich und Europa. I. Teil: Mainz 
(Darstellungsband und Anmerkungsband). Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1962. 
Wójcik, Zbigniew. Jan Kazimierz Waza. Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków: Zakład 
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2004. 
Zarka, Yves-Charles. “Le droit naturel selon Leibniz.“ In La notion de nature chez 
Leibniz, edited by Martine de Gaudemar, 181–192. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995. 
